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REVIEWS
A STRONG VOICE IN THE WILDERNESS
William H. Gates, Jr.*
AmpiCAN LAW: THE CASE FOR RADICAL REFoR . By John P. Frank.

New York: The MacMillan Company, 1969. Pp. 209. $5.95.t
Frank's major premise is that our state and federal courts are so
slow in handling their caseloads that justice is simply unavailable to
most of our citizens. Most of the congestion occurs in metropolitan
centers where conditions have become inexorably worse. At the time
this book was written, the plaintiff in an accident case in Detroit or
Honolulu will wait four years for the case to come to trial; in Manhattan he will wait nearly five years; and in Brooklyn it will take more
than five years before the litigants can be heard in court. In twentyseven counties, each with a population exceeding 750,000 people, the
average time from answer to trial in 1968 was over two and one-half
years. From this statistical base, Frank predicts that as population
increases and more "legalities" are applied to our lives in a complex,
urban society, our system of justice will "bloat into immobility" unless
a way is found to reduce the load.
Although bolstering the judicial ranks is often proffered as a panacea,
Frank asserts that a mere increase in judicial personnel will not solve
the problems of delay and congestion. Conceding that no one has
satisfactorily explained why increasing the number of judges has
generally failed to reduce the backlog, he suggests that this course
* Member, Washington State Bar Ass'n. B.S., 1949, LL.B., 1950, University of
Washington. Mr. Gates is also a past president of the Seattle-King County Bar Asso-

ciation.

t This book is based upon a series of lectures delivered by the author at the
dedication of the Earl Warren Legal Center at the University of California. Mr. Frank's
background qualifies him to speak as an authority on the reform of legal institutions.
After graduation from law school, he served as a clerk to Supreme Court Justice Hugo
L. Black. He subsequently served as Assistant Secretary of the Interior and as an
Assistant Attorney General. He has also taught Constitutional Law and Legal Process
at Yale and Indiana Law Schools. Since 1954, Mr. Frank has been engaged in full
time private practice in Phoenix, Arizona. He has served as a member of the Advisory
Committee on Civil Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States and
has authored eight other books on legal subjects.
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invariably creates a need for more committees and administration,
which in turn decreases the time judges can spend hearing and deciding
cases. As an alternative Frank would devise a system which identifies
those judges whose production is low and increases their levels of
production.
The author points out that the addition of new subjects for legal
determination and the consequent legal complexities cause the whole
body of law to grow faster than the courts can adjudicate it. Frank
views the body of law as a composite of "decision points" to be adjudicated. There is today a dramatic increase in the number of decision
points, continuing without regard to the consequences for the legal
system. The legislatures continuously assign more tasks to the judiciary,
while the courts have significantly increased their own burden by
recognizing new areas of rights entitled to judicial protection.
Having made the case for radical reform, Frank then offers his own
recommendations. However, he cautions that reform proposals must
be tested practically in order to determine their merit, reminding the
reader that many well-qualified reformers enthusiastically embraced
the panacea of the mandatory pretrial conference before it was shown
to be of only limited value. Specifically he sets out thirty-eight proposals. The length of the list of recommendations and the number of
proposals which the author concedes need further study change the
tenor of the work from radical and urgent to temperate and even
tentative. The author's case would have been more effectively stated
had he simply omitted a number of his proposals, some of which are
even contradictory. He suggests, for example, that insurance company
liquidations and receiverships be transferred from the state to the
federal court system, while elsewhere pointing out that the burden on
the courts will not be lightened by the mere removal of proceedings to
another arena, nor by the creation of a special tribunal.
Frank's initial proposal is to alter legal education so as to expose and
eliminate dilatoriness in lawyers. In his opinion the law school experience places a premium on sluggish legal problem-solving. He urges
that with some ingenuity the process could condition lawyers to value
the expedient resolution of legal disputes. One wonders if the problem
can be so easily handled.
Frank strongly advocates a no-fault insurance scheme in the automobile accident field, which would relieve the courts of administering
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remedies in these cases. He would establish a basic protection plan
covering the first $10,000 and provide compensation procedures similar
to those applied in the industrial accident field. Certainly such a proposal may represent the single most effective step toward relieving
court congestion; one need only consider the condition in which our
judicial system would be today were it not for workmen's compensation
schemes. Frank notes with dismay that, other than schemes for
handling automobile accident claims, there are virtually no significant
proposals being advanced to unclog court calendars.
The author goes on to urge that legislatures minimize the number
of "decision points" left for court determination. The recommendation
is not likely to be implemented because of two factors that tend to
enlarge the body of the law. The first is the need for new laws to cover
new problems, such as pollution. The second is the well-established
unwillingness of both the legislatures and the courts to fix arbitrary
standards. The legislatures tend to establish general standards, which
are often imprecisely stated, and leave reluctant courts with the task
of determining whether a given set of circumstances befits them. Difficulty of implementation does not, however, detract from the wisdom of
Frank's proposal. No doubt in many areas society would benefit from
the establishment of arbitrary standards; the occasional injustice which
would result would be offset by the elimination of the potential for
judicial scrutiny of every legally significant act of man.
Frank also assails another massive contributor to court congestiondivorce litigation. He suggests that all jurisdictions would do well to
follow the example set by the California legislature in eliminating the
"grounds" requirement for divorce because it serves no useful social
purpose and needlessly burdens the courts. He urges that property
settlements be handled administratively on the basis of auditors' reports.
He also advocates revision of two procedural rules in order to shorten
or eliminate trials. Rule 36 on Admissions should be used as a matter of
standard practice to place the cost of proof, including attorneys' fees,
on the losing party whenever an issue is unreasonably disputed. Likewise, he urges a dramatic revision of Rule 68 to establish a system
whereby a claimant can make a demand, or a defendant an offer, -with
the result that costs, including counsel fees, will be appropriately
charged where the judgment establishes either that the demand was
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unreasonably high or the offer unreasonably low. Frank argues that
Rule 56 summary judgment is also an appropriate vehicle to shorten
litigation in many cases.
In the field of criminal law, Frank proposes that cases be heard only
by experienced criminal law judges. The defense of insanity, he says,
should be abolished insofar as it has any relevance to guilt or innocence, and should only be considered in sentencing. California has already adopted a bifurcated procedure.' One intriguing proposal would
eliminate the need for witnesses and parties to be together at one time
to give evidence in any trial by using video tapes of testimony made in
the deposition process-the "trial" consisting of a replay of the tapes
by the trier of fact.
While Frank does not engage in strong advocacy for any single proposal, he presents a persuasive argument that our court system is
faltering and that nobody is very serious about remedying the situation. To my mind, the absence of any sense of crisis in the legal community is most remarkable. While in this state current court congestion
is minor, it strikes me as incredible that lawyers and citizens in this
part of the country would tolerate an unreasonable delay in bringing a
case to trial. Surely such a situation should provoke widespread criticism and ultimately reform.
Why is there no evidence of any reform movement in those areas
where litigation is apparently congested? One wonders whether the
statistics cited and relied upon by Frank are really accurate or tell the
whole story. If they are accurate, then one can only conclude that in
the places where these conditions prevail people, even the Bar itself,
must place a low value on the expeditious administration of justice.
Frank's well written, very readable presentation should stimulate
interest in reform and will offer an excellent starting point for anyone
attempting to develop solutions.
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1368 (West 1970). If at any time during the pendency of
a trial, a question arises as to the sanity of the defendant, the court may order the
question of sanity to be determined in a separate trial.
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